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Policy Comment
Security with Transparency: Judicial Review in
"Special Interest" Immigration Proceedings
Much of the debate regarding post-September 11 counterterrorism
initiatives has centered on the potentially damaging effects of these policies
on constitutionally protected rights. Many observers have weighed the
balance that the government has struck between national security and civil
liberties by determining the extent to which new law enforcement initiatives
preserve or encroach upon these rights.'
While scholars debate the legality of the government's new tools, it is
often more difficult to assess whether such initiatives enhance or undermine
security. The war on terrorism relies largely on sensitive intelligence and
covert operations, so "victories" often remain undisclosed. Yet such
assessments will be crucial in defining the future direction of U.S. policy. If
another terrorist attack takes place on American soil, lawmakers will be
called upon to determine whether the attack occurred because law
enforcement personnel were not given adequate tools to prevent it, or
because those tools were used ineffectively. This assessment may determine
whether policymakers rush to provide law enforcement with additional
powers similar to those they already possess, or instead decide to refocus
the nation's overall counterterrorism strategy.
In choosing between these options, it is critical to scrutinize whether
limiting the checks on executive branch authority actually translates into
enhanced security. This Comment takes one step in this direction by
arguing that decreasing transparency through the blanket closure of "special
interest" immigration hearings is unnecessary to preserve security and
may undermine overall counterterrorism efforts. Part I argues that the
1. See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003); Panel Discussion, The USA-PATRIOT Act and the
American Response to Terror: Can We Protect Civil Liberties After September 11?, 39 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1501 (2002).
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closure policy casts an overly broad net by failing to require judicial
determinations that individual aliens pose security threats. Part II evaluates
an already-existing alternative that avoids this problem: the open hearings
of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC). Part III proposes a
compromise scheme based on the ATRC model that allows closed hearings
after case-by-case adjudications of whether particular aliens have terrorist
ties. This compromise model provides a viable alternative that allows the
government to conceal the identities of truly high-risk detainees while
ensuring the valuable safeguard of judicial review. It also reduces the risk
that categorical closure may undermine counterterrorism efforts by
alienating immigrant communities that can serve as allies in intelligence
gathering. Part IV concludes.
I
In immigration cases, the government ordinarily must seek protective
orders from immigration judges to seal testimony that may reveal sensitive
information.2 However, ten days after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, at the direction of the Department of Justice, Chief Immigration
Judge Michael Creppy issued a directive instructing U.S. immigration
judges to close to the press and public all portions of those deportation
hearings designated as "special interest" by the Attorney General.3 The
Creppy directive does not list the criteria for determining which hearings
are to be closed. Instead, it instructs immigration judges that "[fi]f any of
these cases are filed in your court, you will be notified by OCIJ [Office of
the Chief Immigration Judge] that special procedures are to be
implemented" and that "[a] more detailed set of instructions will be
forwarded... to the judge handling the case."4
To justify closing these immigration proceedings, Dale Watson, the FBI
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, set forth a
"mosaic" theory of intelligence. Watson argued that even information that
seems innocuous in isolation, such as the names of those detained, might be
pieced together by terrorist networks to the detriment of U.S. security
5interests. Indeed, Watson stated that "the government cannot proceed to
close hearings on a case-by-case basis, as the identification of certain cases
2. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2004).
3. E-mail and Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All
Immigration Judges and Court Administrators, Instructions for Cases Requiring Additional
Security (Sept. 21, 2001), http://news.f'mdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092 101 memo.pdf.
4. Id.
5. See Declaration of Dale L. Watson at 4-9, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d
937 (E.D. Mich.) (Nos. 02-70339, 02-70340), aff'd, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Ctr. for
Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cerl. denied, 124 S. Ct.
1041 (2004).
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for closure, and the introduction of evidence to support that closure, could
itself expose critical information about which activities and patterns of
behavior merit such closure."6
But the very nature of the mosaic theory renders it overbroad. As the
Sixth Circuit noted,
[T]he Creppy directive does not apply to "a small segment of
particularly dangerous" information, but a broad, indiscriminate
range of information, including information likely to be entirely
innocuous. Similarly, no definable standards used to determine
whether a case is of "special interest" have been articulated.
Nothing in the Creppy directive counsels that it is limited to "a
small segment of particularly dangerous individuals." In fact, the
Government so much as argues that certain non-citizens known to
have no links to terrorism will be designated "special interest"
cases. Supposedly, closing a more targeted class would allow
terrorists to draw inferences from which hearings are open and
which are closed.7
Such an overbroad and effectively unreviewable approach cries out for
judicial oversight of the government's decision to treat an alien as a
potential national security threat, particularly if the government's security
interests can also be accommodated.
II
Procedures are already in place for the use of a specialized court that
can remove alien terrorists through open hearings. The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 8 in conjunction with the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996,9 created the ATRC to adjudicate the deportation of alleged
terrorists.1° Though the court has never been used and its procedures are not
without flaws,1" such a forum-as its name implies-appears at first glance
to be tailor-made for terrorism-related cases.
12
6. Declaration of Dale L. Watson, supra note 5, at 8-9.
7. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692.
8. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15,
18, 22, 28, 40, 42, and 50 U.S.C.).
9. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
10. For the codification of the ATRC, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537 (2000).
11. See Matthew R. Hall, Procedural Due Process Meets National Security: The Problem of
Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 515, 518 (2002).
12. Nowhere in the Watson Declaration, see Declaration of Dale L. Watson, supra note 5, the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Detroit Free Press, see Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681, or the Third
Circuit's decision involving the Creppy directive, see N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcrott,
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Under ATRC procedures, the Attorney General is authorized to file an
application to use the removal court, which is comprised of five district
court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the United States. 13 One of the
five judges then reviews any classified evidence submitted with the
application, ex parte and in camera, to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe that the alien has been correctly identified, that he is a
terrorist, and that removal by normal proceedings would pose a threat to
national security.' 4 If the judge determines that normal proceedings would
compromise security by revealing sensitive intelligence, the ATRC hears
the case. 15 These hearings, though they preserve the secrecy of classified
information, nonetheless remain open to the public, revealing the identity of
the detainees.
Using the ATRC for special interest cases decreases the risk that aliens
will be erroneously deported, because hearings remain open to the public
and because ATRC judges are authorized to evaluate sensitive evidence. It
also partly addresses the government's national security concerns by
keeping the most sensitive intelligence evidence under seal.
Maintaining transparency in all phases of the immigration process is
particularly important in the post-September 11 climate. After witnessing
an attack, individuals may be "more willing to abridge the constitutional
rights of people who are perceived to share something in common with the
'enemy,' either because of their race, ethnicity, or beliefs.' 6 Therefore, the
"[p]resence of the public and press.., helps to assure that the immigration
judge bases his or her opinion on the evidence presented, rather than on
unsupported allegations or fears."' 17 Such sentiments are in accord with the
general practices of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services,
which itself acknowledges the importance of transparency in immigration
proceedings and requires immigration judges to open hearings to the public,
with limited exceptions. 8
Allowing a judge to view in camera the sensitive evidence used to close
an alien's deportation hearing also may help safeguard that alien from being
treated unjustly. The Creppy directive's "special interest" label uniquely
undermines a judge's ability to evaluate whether an individual is a flight
risk or threat to society. As Judge Edmunds of the Eastern District of
Michigan noted, the special interest designation "taint[s] the immigration
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003), is the possibility of using the
ATRC as an alternative to the Creppy directive procedures even mentioned.
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a).
14. See id. § 1533(c).
15. See id.
16. Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (E.D. Mich. 2002), vacated, 76 Fed. Appx.
672 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished decision).
17. Id.
18. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2004).
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judge's decision" and "inevitably suggest[s] a link between [the detainee]
and terrorists or terrorism or, more specifically, the attacks of September
1 l."19 Thus, those without connections to terrorism may be implicated
erroneously by the nonreviewable special interest label. The designation is
based solely on the discretion of the Attorney General and is applied based
on evidence not disclosed to aliens, their attorneys, or the judge hearing the
case. Regardless of the strength of the evidence that detainees present
demonstrating that they pose no security threat, the risk remains that the
Attorney General's label will be ingrained in a judge's mind.
Furthermore, even if a large majority of the special interest cases
involve detainees with terrorist ties, it remains unclear whether a blanket
policy addresses concerns about the disclosure of intelligence and methods
of investigation. The policy is not necessary to secure deportation, since the
government need not present classified information to remove terrorists
guilty of visa violations. Deportation proceedings only require the
government to demonstrate violations of immigration law. 21 In at least one
instance, the government has conceded that it used no classified evidence in
a special interest hearing.22
While the use of the ATRC would provide more transparency than the
Creppy directive procedures, it would fail to address one of the
government's major security concerns: Open hearings would disclose to
terrorist networks the identities of those detained.
It is fair to ask whether this concern is valid, since the Creppy directive
may not completely prevent the disclosure of detainees' identities. First, it
is possible that aliens may disclose their own identities. In fact, subsequent
to his detention, at least one detainee spoke with his attorney, his family,
and members of the press-and even had excerpts of a letter describing the
conditions of his detention published in a Detroit newspaper.23 In this
respect, the Creppy directive is underinclusive, because it fails to protect
what the government considers sensitive information. Although the
Department of Justice attempted to remedy this problem by issuing a rule
prohibiting detainees from disclosing hearing-related information sealed
19. Haddad, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (Edmunds, J.).
20. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The task of
designating a case special interest is performed in secret, without any established standards or
procedures, and the process is, thus, not subject to any sort of review, either by another
administrative entity or the courts. Therefore, no real safeguard on this exercise of authority
exists.").
21. See id. at 709.
22. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Associate Attorney General Jay
Stephens Regarding the Sixth Circuit Decision in the Haddad Case (Apr. 19, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/April02_ag_238.htm (stating that no evidence was presented
during closed hearings that threatened the safety of the American people).
23. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707.
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under a court-issued protective order,24 this rule fails to prevent detainees,
their family members, and their acquaintances from disclosing sensitive
information in the form of the detainees' identities.25 Furthermore, nothing
prevents detainees from revealing this information after they are deported.26
Second, even if terrorists are unable to communicate with their cohorts,
their failure to contact other terrorists might itself signal their capture. If, as
the government claims, networks such as al Qaeda are sophisticated enough
to piece together bits of information to discern patterns of investigation, it
would seem that they would be capable of determining whether or not their
operatives have been caught.
Despite these possible alternative means of identity disclosure, the
government's concerns with open hearings remain valid. By opening
hearings, the government would be voluntarily providing terrorist networks
with potentially valuable information that they would otherwise have to
acquire on their own. Acknowledging this concern, the D.C. Circuit
recently upheld the government's refusal to disclose the names of most of
those it had detained since September 11, finding that "[a] complete list of
names informing terrorists of every suspect detained... would give
terrorist organizations a composite picture of the government investigation,
and .... could allow terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation and
more easily formulate or revise counter-efforts. 27
III
In examining these alternative alien terrorist removal procedures, it
appears that the Creppy directive is overly broad, and the ATRC, while
providing case-by-case judicial review, fails to address the government's
concerns of identity disclosure. The ATRC model, however, can be used to
craft a compromise proposal that finds the proper balance between national
security and civil liberties. This proposed solution would use an Article III
judge to review the government's decision to designate an alien's
immigration proceedings as special interest. Just as the government must
24. See Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799,
36,799-800 (May 28, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.27, 1003.31, 1003.46 (2004)).
25. In a recent decision upholding the government's refusal to reveal information regarding
post-September 11 detainees, Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit recognized, "In sum, each of the
[INS, criminal, and material witness] detainees has had access to counsel, access to the courts, and
freedom to contact the press or the public at large." Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
26. In discussing the Justice Department rule, Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit wrote, "At this
juncture [the end of deportation proceedings], nothing precludes the deportee from
disclosing ... information [like his name or the date and place of his arrest]. Thus, the interim rule
does not remedy the under-inclusiveness of the Creppy directive." Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d
at 708.
27. Ctr.for Nat 'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928.
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ordinarily request that immigration judges keep sensitive information under
seal in immigration hearings, 28 the government should also be required to
submit its designation request to an Article III judge.
As under the ATRC's procedures, the reviewing judge would close the
hearings of those posing a national security threat if he had probable cause
to believe that "the alien who is the subject of the application has been
correctly identified and is an alien terrorist present in the United States" for
whom removal pursuant to open hearings would "pose a risk to the national
security of the United States., 29 ATRC procedures mandate using a
preponderance standard to determine whether an alien should be deported
because he is a terrorist; 30 application of this standard to the initial closure
decision can be debated and later adopted if the probable cause threshold
proves to be too low. In any event, the proceedings following the special
designation would take place, as previously, before an immigration judge.
The government has until now argued that immigration judges lack
necessary expertise in national security to make case-by-case
determinations regarding which immigration hearings should be closed. But
even under current regulations, the government can seek protective orders
from immigration judges to seal evidence whose revelation could harm
national security.31 This history of reliance on immigration judges
undermines the government's contention that only the Attorney General is
qualified to make such intelligence assessments. Furthermore, under this
Comment's compromise, any Article III judges who are experienced in
handling sensitive security matters could be called upon to review special
interest cases. Such judges could include Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court judges, who are specifically named as possible candidates in the
ATRC statute.32
This proposal also avoids a significant security concern associated with
the Creppy directive's procedures. The perception among immigrant
communities that those who are guilty of violating their visas are
categorically placed in secretive proceedings and deported may make it
unlikely that they will come forward with useful intelligence that can assist
counterterrorism investigations. The safeguard of judicial review can
provide some reassurance to these communities that the government must
demonstrate that aliens have terrorist ties before subjecting them to secret
proceedings.
Because members of "sleeper cells" often blend in with immigrant
communities, one effective way of foiling terrorists is to maintain open
28. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (2000).
30. See id. § 1534(g).
31. See8 C.F.R. § 1003.46.
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a).
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lines of communication with communities that may be aware of terrorists
within their ranks. Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson stressed the
importance of working with these communities in September 2002, while
describing the arrest of six suspected al Qaeda operatives in Lackawanna,
New York.33 Thompson stated that the immigrant community provided
"extraordinary cooperation," and that "[t]he assistance of Muslim-
Americans in this case has helped to make the Buffalo community and our
nation safer."34 Law enforcement officials have also successfully recruited
members of immigrant communities to serve as translators for the CIA and
other intelligence agencies. 35 The possibility of alienating these immigrant
groups and losing a potentially valuable ally in counterterrorism efforts
raises a significant policy concern: The success of such efforts may be
undermined by applying the Creppy directive's overbroad procedures to
noncitizens without links to terrorist activity.
IV
Since September 11, much has been made of the difficulty of creating
policies that protect both national security and the rights of immigrant
groups in the United States. Providing judicial review modeled after the
ATRC's procedures in special interest immigration cases will help ensure
that transparency is curtailed only in cases involving terrorists and their
affiliates. Such an approach both respects the government's concerns
regarding identity disclosure and honors the critical role intelligence
gathering will continue to play in the war on terrorism.
-Rashad Hussain
33. See News Conference of Larry Thompson, Robert Mueller, and George Pataki (Sept. 14,
2002), LEXIS, News Library, FDCH Political Transcripts File (remarks of Larry Thompson,
Deputy Attorney General).
34. Id.
35. See David Johnston, F.B.I. Is Accused of Bias by Arab-American Agent, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2003, at 16; David Shepardson, Feds Boost Michigan Terror Fight, DETROIT NEWS, May 29,
2002, at Al.
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